### CP

#### First off is the CP

#### Plan: The United States federal government should substantially increase its economic engagement toward Cuba excluding ending its oil embargo on the Republic of Cuba.

### Politics

#### Immigration will pass- PC key and election pressure

Bob Ray Sanders is a columnist for the Fort Worth Star-Telegram 10-22-2013 <http://www.bnd.com/2013/10/22/2862687/bob-ray-sanders-theres-no-better.html>

Now that the Republican hijacking of the federal government has been brought to an end, perhaps President Barack Obama and Congress can move on to other major issues that have been neglected too long.¶ The president, in addition to wanting to work out a long-term budget deal, has said that he is now ready to push for passage of a comprehensive immigration bill, as well as rescuing the farm bill, which was gutted when GOP lawmakers stripped out the food stamp section.¶ Just a few months ago, immigration reform looked promising, garnering bipartisan support in the Senate. A measure that was long overdue passed the upper chamber in Congress last June, but has been stalled in the House as recalcitrant Republicans simply couldn't stomach the idea of providing a path to citizenship for the millions of illegal immigrants already in the country.¶ While the Senate bill has its faults - including adding 700 miles of new fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border - it is a compromise that, if passed, would be a giant step toward improving the entire immigration system and, at the same time, bringing illegal immigrants out of the shadows.¶ Obama got re-elected partly on his promise to pursue the issue aggressively, receiving 71 percent of the Latino vote. He has not been as aggressive as many would like, even though they're willing to cut him a little slack because of all the uncontrollable international crises and manufactured domestic distractions (like the shutdown of the government) he has had to deal with.¶ But he shouldn't let anything get in his way this time, even though Republicans in the House are vowing not to negotiate with him because the president stood his ground and refused to negotiate on his healthcare law in connection with raising the debt ceiling and ending the government shutdown.¶ House Speaker John Boehner, who has refused to bring the Senate bill to a vote, has said he won't bring any immigration legislation to the floor until a majority of his Republican caucus agrees.¶ That, in effect, means never. Or, if there is a bill that the majority of his party would support, you can almost bet it will be terribly inadequate, one that would not pass the Senate and one that the president wouldn't sign if it did.¶ Boehner, who has been on the losing end a lot lately, ought to be pressured into bringing the Senate bill to a vote. It's clear that on many of the important matters facing this country, the majority of his party in the House will reject just about anything the president supports.¶ Therefore, it will be left up to the House Democrats and the moderate Republicans who are not afraid of the "tea party" to get an immigration bill passed.¶ Since the government shutdown fiasco, in which the GOP unmistakably was the loser, the president has the upper hand, and he should take the opportunity to press forward with his agenda.¶ By no means am I suggesting that Obama become a bully or deliberately attempt to undermine Boehner's leadership, but he shouldn't back away from this fight again.¶ Every time an election approaches - and there's always an approaching election - it is suggested that it's the wrong time to bring up immigration reform.¶ Frankly, there's no better time than right now as candidates prepare to file for office and gear up their campaigns for the 2014 contests.

#### Plan drains PC

LeoGrande, 12

William M. LeoGrande School of Public Affairs American University, Professor of Government and a specialist in Latin American politics and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America, Professor LeoGrande has been a frequent adviser to government and private sector agencies, 12/18/12, http://www.american.edu/clals/upload/LeoGrande-Fresh-Start.pdf

The Second Obama Administration Where in the executive branch will control over Cuba policy lie? Political considerations played a major role in Obama's Cuba policy during the first term, albeit not as preeminent a consideration as they were during the Clinton years. In 2009, Obama's new foreign policy team got off to a bad start when they promised Senator Menendez that they would consult him before changing Cuba policy. That was the price he extracted for providing Senate Democrats with the 60 votes needed to break a Republican filibuster on a must-pass omnibus appropriations bill to keep the government operating. For the next four years, administration officials worked more closely with Menendez, who opposed the sort of major redirection of policy Obama had promised, than they did with senators like John Kerry (D-Mass.), chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, whose views were more in line with the president's stated policy goals. At the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Arturo Valenzuela favored initiatives to improve relations with Cuba, but he was stymied by indifference or resistance elsewhere in the bureaucracy. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having staked out a tough position Cuba during the Democratic primary campaign, was not inclined to be the driver for a new policy. At the NSC, Senior Director for the Western Hemisphere Dan Restrepo, who advised Obama on Latin America policy during the 2008 campaign, did his best to avoid the Cuba issue because it was so fraught with political danger. When the president finally approved the resumption of people-to-people travel to Cuba, which Valenzuela had been pushing, the White House political team delayed the announcement for several months at the behest of Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Any easing of the travel regulations, she warned, would hurt Democrats' prospects in the upcoming mid-term elections.43 The White House shelved the new regulations until January 2011, and then announced them late Friday before a holiday weekend. Then, just a year later, the administration surrendered to Senator Rubio's demand that it limit the licensing of travel providers in exchange for him dropping his hold on the appointment of Valenzuela's replacement.44 With Obama in his final term and Vice-President Joe Biden unlikely to seek the Democratic nomination in 2016 (unlike the situation Clinton and Gore faced in their second term), politics will presumably play a less central role in deciding Cuba policy over the next four years. There will still be the temptation, however, to sacrifice Cuba policy to mollify congressional conservatives, both Democrat and Republican, who are willing to hold other Obama initiatives hostage to extract concessions on Cuba. And since Obama has given in to such hostage-taking previously, the hostage-takers have a strong incentive to try the same tactic again. The only way to break this cycle would be for the president to stand up to them and refuse to give in, as he did when they attempted to rollback his 2009 relaxation of restrictions on CubanAmerican travel and remittances. Much will depend on who makes up Obama's new foreign policy team, especially at the Department of State. John Kerry has been a strong advocate of a more open policy toward Cuba, and worked behind the scenes with the State Department and USAID to clean up the "democracy promotion" program targeting Cuba, as a way to win the release of Alan Gross. A new secretary is likely to bring new assistant secretaries, providing an opportunity to revitalize the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, which has been thoroughly cowed by congressional hardliners. But even with new players in place, does Cuba rise to the level of importance that would justify a major new initiative and the bruising battle with conservatives on the Hill? Major policy changes that require a significant expenditure of political capital rarely happen unless the urgency of the problem forces policymakers to take action.

#### CIR key to prevent employer abuse

Leo Gerard, 2013 [Member of the United Steelworkers, published in the Huffington Post, http://www.calaborfed.org/index.php/site/page/immigration\_reform\_prevents\_employer\_abuse]

Oscar came to the United States at the age of 16 to work. There were no jobs for him in his native Guatemala, and he felt obligated to help support his parents.¶ He was lured across borders by the promise of work. He believed, as so many immigrants do, that there would be a job for him in America.¶ For the past five years, he has worked at a Los Angeles carwash that cheated him and other immigrant workers out of pay, refused protective gear and even denied drinking water.¶ Employers such as carwashes, corporate farms, construction companies and lawn care businesses entice immigrants into the United States by providing jobs with no questions asked. They lure undocumented workers in and then abuse them with impunity. This endangers all workers because the low-wage, hazardous conditions undocumented workers endure can become the standard. This is especially true in bad economic times. More border security is fine. But to ensure safe, family-supporting jobs remain the norm, America must hold employers to account for baiting immigrants.¶ Like many immigrants, Oscar, now 29, stayed with a relative when he arrived in America. At first, he found work delivering cosmetics. The company treated him decently but laid him off when business declined. That's when he got the job at Vermont Car Wash in Los Angeles.¶ The owner promised minimum wage, which was $8 an hour then in California. But when Oscar received his first paycheck, he discovered Vermont paid him $7 an hour and compensated him for only about half the hours he worked.¶ And that was good treatment, according to two studies and an investigation by the Los Angeles Times. The L.A. Times inquiry in 2008, which was about the time Oscar began at Vermont, found the car washes "brazenly violate basic labor and immigration laws with little risk of penalty." Some car wash companies gave workers only tips, so they were paid between $10 and $30 a day. Others paid as little as $1.63 an hour.¶ The University of Illinois at Chicago Labor Education Program investigated carwashes in the Windy City and found they ripped off their mostly immigrant workforce by about $2.2 million a year. Nearly a quarter of the workers subsisted below the federal level for extreme poverty—even after they worked more than 40 hours a week. Eighty percent received no protective equipment and many were cut, suffered rashes or experienced nausea and dizziness from the carwash chemicals. Two-thirds did not have access to clean or free drinking water at work.¶ In addition, a 2008 study by three non-profit organizations, "Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers," found employers who paid low wages in New York City, Los Angeles and Chicago routinely violated labor laws, committed wage theft and exposed workers to hazards. The workers included undocumented immigrants but Native Americans as well.¶ The L.A. Times investigation and the studies expose several causes for the exploitation. One is insufficient enforcement. Another is the vulnerability of undocumented immigrants.¶ When workers like Oscar complained, carwash owners threatened them. It's not an empty threat. Last May, after Palermo's Pizza factory workers in Milwaukee signed a petition to form a union, the company fired 89 undocumented workers.¶ Oscar says when he asked his co-workers about the wage theft, they said the owner told them he could do whatever he wanted because the workers had no rights.¶ Workers don't really have rights unless they are enforced. Non-profit groups and unions in New York, Illinois and California have helped some workers attain their rights. They've filed numerous lawsuits against carwash companies and badgered state agencies to cite companies for violations. For example, last May, with the help of community groups, immigrant workers at a Bronx carwash sued and four workers at an L.A. carwash filed a class-action suit for unpaid wages and other abuses.¶ In January of 2012, the California state attorney general's office secured a $1 million settlement from eight carwash companies for wage theft. Last July, a New York judge sentenced a Bronx carwash owner to 32 days in jail and ordered him to pay $150,000 to workers denied minimum wage.¶ A little less than two years ago, Oscar and the workers at the Vermont Car Wash got help from the Community Labor Environmental Action Network (CLEAN) and the United Steelworkers (USW) union. Oscar said a co-worker told him that the USW could help them get paid their rightful wages if they organized and bargained collectively with the carwash owner. Oscar, who is unmarried and has no children, agreed to meet with an organizer because he was receiving so little in wages that he was having a hard time supporting himself and sending money to his parents. He explained:¶ I couldn't put up any longer with what the owner was doing.¶ When a group of workers told the owner they wanted a union, Oscar thinks the owner was relieved that they weren't filing a costly lawsuit. The owner agreed a year ago to recognize the union, and Oscar and his co-workers now receive the correct pay. They get breaks, drinking water and protective gear like rubber gloves. The USW represents workers at three L.A. carwashes now, and the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union represents workers at five in New York City.¶ Oscar said he believes that if no path to citizenship is provided to the 11 million undocumented immigrants already in America, business owners will feel free to continue to mistreat workers, documented and undocumented, because unions and community groups won't be able to help them all.¶ President Obama has proposed new legislation that would provide a path to citizenship and further secure the boarders but, critically, would also crack down on companies that lure undocumented workers into the country by illegally hiring them.¶ That is essential to secure the dignity of all workers.¶

#### **And it’s key to prevent human trafficking—moral obligation**

FNCC, 2013 [The Freedom Network, a large non-profit organization that aims to prevent and eradicate human trafficking, “Human trafficking and immigration rights: Comprehensive Immigration reform, http://freedomnetworkusa.org/human-trafficking-and-immigrant-rights-comprehensive-immigration-reform/]

The Freedom Network (USA) commends President Obama and the bipartisan group of senators for their efforts to engage in comprehensive immigration reform. As a coalition of experts on the scourge of human trafficking, we believe that a proposal to overhaul immigration laws deeply impacts the clients we serve. Creating a path to legalization for undocumented immigrants outright will provide immigrant workers with more economic security and make them less vulnerable to labor exploitation and human trafficking. Promoting family reunification and reducing family visa backlogs will protect the families of trafficked and exploited workers from retaliation from criminal perpetrators in their home country. Furthermore, we welcome a framework that includes protecting immigrant victims of crime and domestic violence through humanitarian relief.

It is our experience that increased enforcement efforts can lead to a chilling effect among the most exploited immigrants. Enhanced security may reverse the course of the government’s efforts to raise awareness in identifying potential trafficked persons. Additionally, temporary workers, regardless of industry, should have a path to legalization to reduce their susceptibility to exploitation and abuse. We look forward to collaborating with the administration and members of Congress in outlining this proposed legislation. See our policy recommendations on “Human Trafficking and Immigrant Rights.”

### PIC

#### Text: The negative team advocates the entirety of the 1AC sans the use of personal pronouns.

#### Personal pronouns necessitate destructive dichotomies which assures violence, the adherence to grammatical rules makes rhizomatic politics impossible

Schantz 9 (ORLA SCHANTZ writes for the enlightenment underground, “The Urdoxa of Personal Pronouns” <http://enlightenmentunderground.blogspot.com/2009/03/urdoxa-of-personal-pronouns_28.html>)

Grammar has always been the fearful guardian against the chaos of language, the general commanding the unruly troops. A system of indoctrination, created by meticulous bureaucrats in the service of the State (clergy, literati, linguistic accountants, and pedants). Grammar is not to be believed, but to be obeyed. In education when a teacher explains the rules, no information is communicated, instead orders are given. **If language is water, grammar is ice.** The personal pronouns as graphic entities came relatively late in Indo-European languages, but have since reigned supreme. And along with it the subject became the Cartesian king. Andthe object the ambitious prince, always trying to usurp the power of the throne**.** However**, when the first homo sapiens spied a member of a different tribe, he cried out and defined the fatal creation of The Other. The dualism between, the attraction and enmity** of the two have **since bedeviled thinking, always creating** destructive dichotomies**.** Squeezed in in the space, left open, **the verb insisted on its rightful place as the doer.** It meant action. The verb also came in Harlequin clothing with many patchworks of colors**.** One of them threatened the subject: the infinitive. Verbs in the infinitive have the courage to challenge the hierarchical power structure. True revolutionaries**!** No longer is “the subject” the dictator, and no more can “the object” claim its right as heir apparent. In fact, verbs in the infinitive are limitless becomings, blissfully ignoring the personal pronoun of the subject. Infinite-becomings have no “fathers”, only referring to an “it” of the event = it is raining - or thinking. Infinitives are too busy becoming, too action-orientated, too much process, too few (if any) products. Becomings which both await the missing subject and precede it**. Thinking in the infinitive means transcending personal pronouns.** To die, to live, to love, to ponder, to do. **Never-ending flux** and flows**. Personal pronouns breed opposition, the dreaded cul-de-sacs of discussion which never finds its way, always** losing direction and purpose**. Personal pronouns demand numbers: three of them. Singular and plural.** What about a fourth or more? **Grammar is Stalinistic and tolerates no insurgents or dissidents**, yetthis is what it needs to survive outside of the Gulag**.** Where Urdoxa provides “stable entities” out in the world that corresponds to distinct faculties, paradox points to the unstable character of the relationship of language and world. Representation **is exactly this: a second version: a RE of what is presented, and consequently a fraud of a fraud. Language is always more than language. Or better, language is always more than representation. It spills over into the world, woven, as it is, into the world in order to be able to function as representation.** This quilt requires paradoxes of sense and nonsense that escape the grasp of language. But **personal pronouns don’t care,** having secured their place in human communication. There is no escape. **And so, dualisms fester like virus when they could** thrive as rhizom

### Case

#### Plan causes Saudi freakout – perception of demand decreases and causes backstopping.

Morse, Executive Adviser at Hess Energy Trading Company and was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Energy Policy in 1979-81, and Richard, a portfolio manager at Firebird Management, an investment fund active in eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia, 2

(Edward L, and James, Foreign Affairs, “The Battle for Energy Dominance,” factiva, accessed 5-5-11, CMM)

A simple fact explains this conclusion: 63 percent of the world's proven oil reserves are in the Middle East, 25 percent (or 261 billion barrels) in Saudi Arabia alone. As the largest single resource holder, Saudi Arabia has a unique petroleum policy that is designed to maximize the benefit of holding so much of the world's oil supply. Saudi Arabia's goal is to assure that oil's role in the international economy is maintained as long as possible. Hence Saudi policy has always denounced efforts by industrialized countries to wean themselves from oil dependence, whether through tax policy or regulation. Saudi strategy focuses on three different political arenas. The first involves the ties between the Saudi kingdom and other OPEC countries. The second concerns Riyadh's relationship with the non-OPEC producers: Mexico, Norway, and now Russia. Finally, there is Saudi Arabia's link to the major oil-importing regions -- most importantly North America, but also Europe and Asia. ¶ Given the size of the Saudi oil sector, the kingdom has a unique and critical role in setting world oil prices. Since its overriding objectives are maximizing revenues generated from oil exports and extending the life of its petroleum reserves, Riyadh aims to keep prices high as long as possible. But the price cannot be so high that it stifles demand or encourages other competitive sources of supply. Nor can it be so low that the kingdom cannot achieve minimum revenue targets. The critical balancing act of Saudi foreign policy, therefore, is to maintain oil prices within a reasonable price band. Stopping oil prices from falling below the minimum level requires cooperation from other OPEC countries and occasionally from non-OPEC producers. Preventing oil prices from rising too high requires keeping enough spare production capacity to use in an emergency. ¶ This latter feature is the signal characteristic of Saudi policy. The kingdom can afford to maintain this spare capacity because of the abundance of its oil reserves and the comparatively low cost of developing and producing its reserve base. In today's soft market, in which Saudi Arabia produces around 7.4 mbd, the kingdom has close to 3 mbd of spare capacity. Its spare capacity is usually ample enough to entirely displace the production of another large oil-exporting country if supply is disrupted or a producer tries to reduce output to increase prices. Not only does this spare capacity help the kingdom keep prices in check, but it also serves to link Riyadh with the United States and other key oil-importing countries. It is a blunt instrument that makes policymakers elsewhere beholden to Riyadh for energy security. This spare capacity is greater than the total exports of all other oil- exporting countries -- except Russia. ¶ Saudi spare capacity is the energy equivalent of nuclear weapons, a powerful deterrent against those who try to challenge Saudi leadership and Saudi goals. It is also the centerpiece of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. The United States relies on that capacity as the cornerstone of its oil policy. That arrangement was fine as long as U.S. protection meant Riyadh would not "blackmail" Washington -- an assumption that is more difficult to accept after September 11. Saudi Arabia's OPEC partners must also cooperate with the kingdom in part to prevent Riyadh from producing a glut and having prices collapse; spare capacity also serves to pressure key non-OPEC producers to cooperate with Saudi Arabia when necessary. But unlike the nuclear deterrent, the Saudi weapon is actively used when required. The kingdom has periodically (and brutally) demonstrated that it can use its spare capacity to destroy exports from countries challenging its market share. This tactic is the weapon that Saudi Arabia could use if Moscow ignores Riyadh's requests for cooperation. ¶ Saudi Arabia has triggered its spare capacity twice in recent history, once when prices were especially low. Both cases demonstrated that the kingdom will accept those low prices so long as it suffers less than its targets do. In 1985, Saudi Arabia successfully waged a price war designed to force other oil producers to stop "free riding" on Saudi oil policy. That policy meant that those states had to cooperate with the kingdom by reining in production enough to allow Saudi Arabia to produce the minimum level that it targeted. Oil prices fell by more than half within a few months, and Saudi Arabia immediately regained the market share it had lost in the preceding four years, mainly to non-OPEC countries.

#### Lower oil prices cause Russian economic decline and massive instability

Adomanis, Forbes, 12

(Mark, 5-14-12, “Russia's Economy is Still Growing, and Why This Matters,” http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2012/05/24/russias-economy-is-still-growing-and-why-this-matters/, accessed 1-19-13, CMM)

I’ve long been of the opinion that a regime like Putin’s that is so clearly based on “performance legitimacy,” growing wages and generally improved standards of living, is extremely vulnerable to a genuine economic downturn.\* A good deal of Putin’s popularity is due to the fact that, because of sustained, long-term growth in the prices of oil and natural gas, he’s been in a position to dispense an awful lot of largess in the form of higher wages for public sector workers, larger pensions for retirees, subsidies for families with young children, and a virtually endless list of loans, credits, tax write-offs, and “targeted” investments. In very simple terms, the economic pie has been growing, the state still has control over a healthy portion of it, and Putin has therefore been in a position to throw a lot of money at any problem.¶ This sort of politics is only sustainable so long as the economic pie is actually growing: the minute that growth stagnates, much less turns negative, the government finds it impossible to please all of the competing interests at the same time. Hard decisions have to be made about which group benefits and which has to suffer, and the groups on the wrong side of the calculation are obviously not going to be pleased about it. Indeed depending on just how angry the losers in the resource allocation game get, they can easily transform from group that was easily co-opted with carrots into one that has to be actively repressed with sticks.¶ So one of the most important questions that about Russia, likely the single most important question about the country’s long-term trajectory as well as its immediate political future, is “is the economy growing?” If the economy is in fact growing, then current system’s internal logic will keep it operating. Perhaps awkwardly, perhaps brutally, perhaps even unsustainably, but operating nonetheless. If the economy is not growing, if the Kremlin has to try and placate multitudinous interest groups with a shrinking pile of money, then the system will seize up and crash.¶ This is why I object to a generally quite reasonable and informative Economist story about the make-up of Russia’s new cabinet. As the article says:¶ The cabinet will soon face a painful dilemma in economic policy. Should it favour the handful of extraordinarily powerful businessmen close to Mr Putin and the managers of large, state-run companies, or the country’s rural and working-class population, which Mr Putin increasingly perceives as his electoral base? Both groups are essential to the stability of Mr Putin’s rule, yet are fighting over the same shrinking economic pie.¶ I agree that there are serious and growing tensions between Putin’s electoral base (“real Russians” if we apply the hackneyed formulation so often used in American politics) and the oligarchs who dominate the highest levels of the “vertical of power.” I even agree with the article’s contention that these tensions are, at a basic level, irreconcilable: the sorts of policies that boost the oligarchs harm the working class and the sorts of politics which benefit the working class harm the oligarchs. But is the economic pie actually shrinking? No, it’s clearly not shrinking. Indeed it’s not only growing, it’s growing more quickly than in most of Russia’s neighbors.¶ This all might seem like a minor technicality or an unduly legalistic reading of a simple blog post, but as I’ve tried to explain above it’s actually of the utmost importance. Russia’s political stability is predicated on a growing economy, and the economy is currently growing at a healthy (if not overwhelming) clip. This is not to say that Russia’s economy will grow forever or that it won’t be adversely impacted by the increasingly chaotic and dangerous crisis in the Eurozone, it’s simply to say that, at the moment, the system is not being forced to deal with a shrinking economic pie. The current pace of growth seems sufficient to preserve the broad continuity of the current political arrangement. This will not always be the case, but if I were forced to wager I would say that the Kremlin will muddle through for at least another few years.

#### Russian decline goes nuclear

Filger, founder of GlobalEconomicCrisis.com, 9

(Sheldon, 5-10-09, “Russian Economy Faces Disastrous Free Fall Contraction,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis\_b\_201147.html, accessed 5-9-11, CMM)

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

#### Gradualism solves

#### A – Normalized US-Cuban ties coming. Happens by 2018 under Diaz-Canel.

Gott ‘13

Richard Gott is a writer and historian. He worked for many years at the Guardian as a leader-writer, foreign correspondent and as the features editor. He is the author of Cuba: A New History, published by Yale University Press – Guardian – Feb 25th – http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/feb/25/cuba-us-ties-castro-raul

The mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small. So it is with the history of Cuba, which has long moved forward at a barely observable speed. The announcement by Raúl Castro, aged 81, that he will retire in 2018 (after two terms in office), and that his likely successor as eventual president will be Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermúdez (now appointed vice-president), aged 52, suddenly catapults the half-century-old revolutionary process into new and unfamiliar waters.

By 2018, Fidel Castro, aged 86, long described as an ageing revolutionary, will likely be dead; so too will most likely be Cuba's revolutionary ally in Venezuela, Hugo Chávez. Barack Obama will also have left the scene, the last of nearly a dozen US presidents that the Cuban revolution has outlived. Cuba will then move forward at its customary glacial pace without any Castros at the helm and without any members of the revolutionary generation of 1959 that will by then have guided the country for nearly 60 years (the retiring vice-president, the revolutionary veteran José Ramón Ventura Machado, was born in 1930 and is 30 years older than his replacement). Four questions immediately pose themselves. What is the nature and character of the new leader? What will be his impact on the internal Cuban scene? What will be the future of the all-important economic relationship with Venezuela, which provides cheap oil in exchange for Cuban developmental aid (in terms of doctors, security advisers and sports instructors)? And how will a new Cuban leadership affect relations with the United States which has maintained an economic blockade of the island for the past half century? For supporters of the Cuban revolution, there are reasons to give optimistic answers to all four questions. Diaz-Canel may have an unfortunate physical resemblance to a Soviet-style Bulgarian apparatchik of yesteryear but he has proved to be a competent administrator and a genial party chief in two provinces, Villa Clara and Holguín. Plucked from relative obscurity to be the youngest ever member of the politburo, he has been minister of higher education and has recently taken on important foreign roles. With a background as a university professor and an enthusiastic cyclist, he has also served in the armed forces, a significant and necessary detail in the biography of a future leader. As a protégé of Raúl Castro, Diaz-Canel has been a supporter of the current programme to introduce market forces into some aspects of the economy and there is no reason to suppose that this would not continue. The list of reforms is impressive: the introduction of co-operatives outside the agricultural area; the creation of private farms and businesses; the sale of private houses and cars; and the availability of visas for foreign travel. For many people these reforms have not gone far enough, but the new mood of optimism in Cuba is palpable. Diaz-Canel has also been a strong advocate of the existing close relationship with Venezuela which will continue for the next six years under the likely Venezuelan presidency of Nicolas Maduro, the chosen successor of Chávez. So no change there either. An important feature of this relationship, aside from its economic benefits, is that Cuba is now respected and welcomed throughout the continent, not just with Venezuela's close ideological allies like Bolivia and Ecuador, but also with Brazil and Argentina. In this context it is now the US that is the odd man out. Indeed the most intriguing question now concerns Cuba's future relationship with the US. Many people have expressed the hope that Obama, with no re-election problem to worry about, might feel emboldened to make conciliatory noises towards the existing Castro government. Most people both in Cuba and in the US have begun to forget what the quarrel was all about. The road to a new friendship remains a possibility, yet one of the stumbling blocks has been the continued existence of a Castro in power. Under the terms of the Helms-Burton Act, imposed by the US Congress in 1996, the US cannot contemplate recognising a Cuban government in which one of the Castro brothers has a continuing role. By 2018, this will no longer be relevant. There seems little doubt that under a future President Diaz-Canel, Cuba would be able to forge a new and beneficial relationship with the US.

#### B – Embargo will inevitably and slowly fall in the squo—solves the aff

Franks ‘8

Jeff Franks – Havana correspondent for Reuter’s – New York Times – 6/12/2008¶ http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/business/worldbusiness/12iht-cubaoil.4.13670441.html?\_r=0

Sometime next year, Cuba plans to begin drilling a major oil field off its northern coast that might do what little else has done - bring change to U.S-Cuba relations.¶ In a rare confluence of circumstances - including a new leader in Havana and a new one coming to the United States, as well as record-high crude oil prices - a new petroleum source could grease the wheels for the two longtime foes to reunite out of mutual need, experts say.¶ Getting there would require a sea change in U.S. policy, namely altering the U.S. trade embargo imposed against Cuba in 1962 to try to topple Fidel Castro's Communist government.¶ If the embargo remains as is, a nearby source of oil will be off limits to the United States, and the American oil industry will miss out on billions of dollars of business.¶ Opponents of the embargo rule out any change until President George W. Bush, who has toughened the embargo, leaves office next year.¶ Even then they can expect a fight from influential Cuban-American leaders, who argue that helping Cuba produce oil will aid the Cuban government and undermine the 46-year-old embargo's reason for being.¶ "We think what really needs to happen in Cuba is for that system to change," U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez, who was born in Cuba, told Reuters.¶ But opponents of the embargo say the combination of economics, energy needs and environmental concerns, as well as new leaders in the two countries, make easing the embargo possible.¶ "The pro-embargo status quo is really threatened right now," said Sarah Stephens, director of the Center for Democracy in the Americas. "The sands are running out of the clock on the policy and I think that has the pro-embargo folks worried."¶ The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated the Cuban field holds at least five billion barrels of recoverable oil and 10 trillion cubic feet, or 280 billion cubic meters, of natural gas.¶ In a few years, Cuba could be producing 525,000 barrels of oil a day, enough to make it energy independent and perhaps even an oil exporter, said Jorge Piñón, a former oil company executive who is now a researcher at the University of Miami. Cuba currently consumes 145,000 barrels of oil daily, of which 92,000 barrels come from Venezuela, though that would most certainly rise if the embargo were lifted.¶ The government has sold oil concessions to seven companies and has said a consortium of Spanish, Indian and Norwegian companies will drill the first production well in the first half of 2009.¶ Drilling was supposed to begin this year and has been put off twice because of undisclosed factors that U.S. experts said most likely included difficulty getting a rig because global drilling activity was high, the need for more facilities to handle the oil and possible effects of the U.S. embargo.¶ The Cuban field lies as much as six miles, or 9.7 kilometers, below the sea surface, depths at which U.S. production technology is superior, said a Cuban oil expert, Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, at the University of Nebraska-Omaha.¶ "Cuba and none of the present partners have that capability without accessing American technology, and therein lies the rub," he said. "U.S. export controls forbid them to transfer that technology to Cuba."¶ Cuba, looking past the United States, has been in talks with Petrobras of Brazil, which has deep-water expertise, about getting involved.¶ The embargo has withstood repeated legislative attempts to loosen its terms, including unsuccessful bills in the U.S. Congress in 2006 to exempt oil companies.¶ But Kirby Jones, a consultant on Cuban business and founder of the U.S.-Cuba Trade Association in Washington, and who is against the embargo, said a big Cuba oil find would change the political equation.¶ "This is the first time that maintaining the embargo actually costs the United States something," he said. "And we need oil. We need it from wherever we can get it, and in this case it's 50 miles off our coast."

#### We don’t need to embrace war in every instance as long as we don’t engage in pure pacifism.

CAVARERO, 9 [Adriana, Professor of Political Philosophy at the Università degli studi di Verona, **Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence**, p. 63-4]

At the start of the third millennium, in other words in the era of so-called global war, a prime example of this is a book published in the United States by James Hillman in 2004. It is entitled *A Terrible Love of War* and is based on the Jungian theory of archetypes. But the book stands out not because of the reference to Jung, or to psychoanalysis in general, but because of the nonchalance with which Hillman recuperates and mixes together the main strands of twentieth-century naturalistic thought on violence to corroborate his thesis. He maintains that war “belongs to our souls as an archetypal truth of the cosmos” and that this archetypal truth is, as the title of his second chapter puts it, “normal.” He proceeds with an analysis of the theme of a horror that remains human even in its atrocious inhumanity, adding that war is sublime and belongs to the sphere of religion. “If war is sublime, we must acknowledge its liberating transcendence and yield to the holiness of its call.” This does not mean, obviously, that Hillman wishes for a perpetual state of war. His aim is rather to get rid of the “pacifist rhetoric” that, in denying the natural – psychic – root of the phenomenon, impedes comprehension of it.

#### We can combine a love of war with a love of peace. This is critical to avoid idolizing the warrior and making war inevitable.

STUHR, 8 [John, Arts and Sciences Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and American Studies, and Chair, Department of Philosophy, Emory University; “A Terrible Love of Hope,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 22:4]

If Hillman is right, he is only partly right. We may have a terrible love of war. But we can and do have other loves as well. It is not my only love, but I confess to an unshakable, terrible love of hope, and peace too. Because I do not share Hillman's [End Page 283] Jungian psychological commitments, I am not sure that this love is archetypal or universal. Maybe Paul Simon is right that " everybody loves the sound of a train in the distance," that "the thought that life could be better is woven indelibly into our hearts and our brains."10 Or maybe only some people love this sound, and maybe this thought is woven only precariously into some hearts and bones sometimes. But I am sure that this love of hope and peace has a history and expression equal in duration and depth to those of love of war. I am sure that for every General Patton, quoted by Hillman, who proclaims love of war beyond love of life, there is a General MacArthur, who proclaimed just as strongly, "I have seen war. . . . I hate war." Or there is a General (and President) Eisenhower, who observed in 1953 that war "is not a way of life at all in any true sense" but only "humanity hanging on a cross of iron." Or there is a General Sherman, who said that "war is hell." Or there is a Senator John McCain, who said: "War is wretched beyond description, and only a fool or a fraud could sentimentalize its cruel reality." And then what, now what? What should a meliorist do? Terrible lovers of hope and peace often have answered this question in one or both of two ways. The first is the way of individual self-transformation. I think of this strategy as an "Inward Bound" program. "War and peace start in the hearts of individuals," Pema Chodron writes.11 The way to peace is the way of turning hearts of war into hearts of peace and nonviolence; hearts open to what Gandhi called the "infinite possibilities of universal love," universal truth, and the God within us all; and hearts in community and communion with one another.12 All we need is love—though, of course, that is a lot, and this way is difficult. It requires that we reject as our ideal the strategic warrior: War will exist, John F. Kennedy said, "until that distant day when the conscientious objector enjoys the same reputation and prestige as the warrior does today."

#### Hillman’s argument is incoherent, and justifies the worst atrocities of warfare in the name of extinguishing the innocent. We are not warriors, we are policymakers.

CAVARERO, 9 [Adriana, Professor of Political Philosophy at the Università degli studi di Verona, **Horrorism: Naming Contemporary Violence**, p. 63-4]

As the reader will easily intuit, while the authors cited (often inappropriately) are highly disparate, it is principally categories deriving from psychoanalysis, the sociology of the sacred, and the anthropology of sacrifice that underpin the articulation of Hillman’s discourse. The theoretical density, as well as the internal problematic of these categories, which in his text are forced to undergo drastic simplification, are transformed into banal clichés. In order to justify war as an unrenounceable and vital experience, Hillman often appeals not just to the authority of his authors but to a so-called common opinion that by now constitutes the vulgate, in the form of the stereotypical and the obvious, of those same authors. An example is the facility with which he takes for granted “our fascination with war films, with weapons of mass destruction, with pictures of blasted bodies and bombs bursting in the air.” To this Hillman adds, on a confessional note, “the fascination, the delight in recounting the dreadful details of butchery and cruelty. Not sublimation, the sublime.” Typical as well in the way it casts a shadow of abnormality – if not pathological stupidity or obtuseness – over those who do not share the fascination with butchery, Hillman’s thesis has its own stringent logic. Once violence is rooted in the natural realm of the impulses or, if one prefers, in the archetypical order of the cosmos, the horror of war cannot fail to transmit its fascination both to everyone’s visual experience and to the literary practice of some. And, even more logically, it is combatants with firsthand experience in the field who savor the full fascination. The words of the soldiers that Hillman diligently reports in his text for the purpose of documenting his theory prove it. Among them, the words of a cinematographic version of General Patton stand out, when, faced with the devastation of battle and kissing a dying officer, he exclaims, “I love it. God help me, I do love it so. I love it more than my life.” Then there is the authentic declaration of a marine who confesses, “The thing I wish I’d seen – I wish I could have seen a grenade go into someone’s body and blow it up.” No one else, though, rivals the laudable capacity to synthesize of the anonymous American soldier who, in describing a bayonet charge, defines it as “awful, horrible, deadly, yet somehow thrilling, exhilarating.” In the name of a realism grounded in the power of cliché, the entire repertory or war’s horror is thus reduced by Hillman to the realm of enjoyment. “The savage fury of the group, all of whose members are out for one another’s blood,” which the celebrated work of Rene Girard inscribes in the phenomenology of ritual, becomes the trivial wage of the warrior. For that matter the stereotype of the soldier excited by killing has a long and prestigious history. A certain arousal by violence was already characteristic of Homer’s warriors, and the warmongering rhetoric of every age, ennobled by writers and poets, is full of soldiers made happy by death. The events of the twentieth century, and even more those occurring right now, might suggest to the singers and scholars of massacre that they change register. Today it is particularly senseless that the meaning of war and its horror – as well, obviously, as its terror – should still be entrusted to the perspective of the warrior. If it is true, as the historian Giovanni De Luna laments, that “wars, with the violence and cruelty they unleash, appear to have a common ground (killing and getting killed), always the same and impervious to chronology,” it is also true that only warriors, after all, fit this paradigm. The civilian victims, of whom the numbers of dead have soared from the Second World War on, do not share the desire to kill, much less the desire to get killed. Nor does the pleasure of butchery, on which Hillman insists, appear to constitute a possible common ground in this case. You would have to ask the victims of the bombing, cooked by incendiary bombs in the shelters of Dresden, or those whose skin was peeled off by phosphorous bombs in the Vietnamese villages, where the pleasure and excitement was for them. And you would have to put the same question to the children blown up in many parts of the world by antipersonnel mines or to the engaged couple who, falling like marionettes from the Twin Towers in flames, took final flight in New York on the morning of September 11.

#### Their expansion of structural violence to an all-pervasive force makes preventing war impossible and renders the concept meaningless

**Boulding**, Center for Research on Conflict Resolution, **1978**

(Ken, “Future Directions in Conflict and Peace Studies”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22.2, SAGE)

Galtung is very legitimately interested in problems of world poverty and the failure of development of the really poor. He tried to amalga- mate this interest with the peace research interest in the more narrow sense. Unfortunately, he did this by downgrading the study of inter- national peace, labeling it "negative peace" (it should really have been labeled "negative war") and then developing the concept of "structural violence," which initially meant all those social structures and histories which produced an expectation of life less than that of the richest and longest-lived societies. He argued by analogy that if people died before the age, say, of 70 from avoidable causes, that this was a death in "war"' which could only be remedied by something called "positive peace." Unfortunately, the concept of structural violence was broadened, in the word of one slightly unfriendly critic, to include anything that Galtung did not like. Another factor in this situation was the feeling, certainly in the 1960s and early 1970s, that nuclear deterrence was actually succeeding as deterrence and that the problem of nuclear war had receded into the background. This it seems to me is a most danger- ous illusion and diverted conflict and peace research for ten years or more away from problems of disarmament and stable peace toward a grand, vague study of world developments, for which most of the peace researchers are not particularly well qualified. To my mind, at least, the quality of the research has suffered severely as a result.' The complex nature of the split within the peace research community is reflected in two international peace research organizations. The official one, the International Peace Research Association (IPRA), tends to be dominated by Europeans somewhat to the political left, is rather, hostile to the United States and to the multinational cor- porations, sympathetic to the New International Economic Order and thinks of itself as being interested in justice rather than in peace. The Peace Science Society (International), which used to be called the Peace Research Society (International), is mainly the creation of Walter Isard of the University of Pennsylvania. It conducts meetings all around the world and represents a more peace-oriented, quantitative, science- based enterprise, without much interest in ideology. COPRED, while officially the North American representative of IPRA, has very little active connection with it and contains within itself the same ideological split which, divides the peace research community in general. It has, however, been able to hold together and at least promote a certain amount of interaction between the two points of view. Again representing the "scientific" rather than the "ideological" point of view, we have SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, very generously (by the usual peace research stand- ards) financed by the Swedish government, which has performed an enormously useful service in the collection and publishing of data on such things as the war industry, technological developments, arma- ments, and the arms trade. The Institute is very largely the creation of Alva Myrdal. In spite of the remarkable work which it has done, how- ever, her last book on disarmament (1976) is almost a cry of despair over the folly and hypocrisy of international policies, the overwhelming power of the military, and the inability of mere information, however good, go change the course of events as we head toward ultimate ca- tastrophe. I do not wholly share her pessimism, but it is hard not to be a little disappointed with the results of this first generation of the peace research movement. Myrdal called attention very dramatically to the appalling danger in which Europe stands, as the major battleground between Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union if war ever should break out. It may perhaps be a subconscious recognition-and psychological denial-of the sword of Damocles hanging over Europe that has made the European peace research movement retreat from the realities of the international system into what I must unkindly describe as fantasies of justice. But the American peace research community, likewise, has retreated into a somewhat niggling scientism, with sophisticated meth- odologies and not very many new ideas. I must confess that when I first became involved with the peace research enterprise 25 years ago I had hopes that it might produce some- thing like the Keynesian revolution in economics, which was the result of some rather simple ideas that had never really been thought out clearly before (though they had been anticipated by Malthus and others), coupled with a substantial improvement in the information system with the development of national income statistics which rein- forced this new theoretical framework. As a result, we have had in a single generation a very massive change in what might be called the "conventional wisdom" of economic policy, and even though this conventional wisdom is not wholly wise, there is a world of difference between Herbert Hoover and his total failure to deal with the Great Depression, simply because of everybody's ignorance, and the moder- ately skillful handling of the depression which followed the change in oil prices in 1-974, which, compared with the period 1929 to 1932, was little more than a bad cold compared with a galloping pneumonia. In the international system, however, there has been only glacial change in the conventional wisdom. There has been some improvement. Kissinger was an improvement on John Foster Dulles. We have had the beginnings of detente, and at least the possibility on the horizon of stable peace between the United States and the Soviet Union, indeed in the whole temperate zone-even though the tropics still remain uneasy and beset with arms races, wars, and revolutions which we cannot really afford. Nor can we pretend that peace around the temper- ate zone is stable enough so that we do not have to worry about it. The qualitative arms race goes on and could easily take us over the cliff. The record of peace research in the last generation, therefore, is one of very partial success. It has created a discipline and that is something of long-run consequence, most certainly for the good. It has made very little dent on the conventional wisdom of the policy makers anywhere in the world. It has not been able to prevent an arms race, any more, I suppose we might say, than the Keynesian economics has been able to prevent inflation. But whereas inflation is an inconvenience, the arms race may well be another catastrophe. Where, then, do we go from here? Can we see new horizons for peace and conflict research to get it out of the doldrums in which it has been now for almost ten years? The challenge is surely great enough. It still remains true that war, the breakdown of Galtung's "negative peace," remains the greatest clear and present danger to the human race, a danger to human survival far greater than poverty, or injustice, or oppression, desirable and necessary as it is to eliminate these things. Up to the present generation, war has been a cost and an inconven- ience to the human race, but it has rarely been fatal to the process of evolutionary development as a whole. It has probably not absorbed more than 5% of human time, effort, and resources. Even in the twenti- eth century, with its two world wars and innumerable smaller ones, it has probably not acounted for more than 5% of deaths, though of course a larger proportion of premature deaths. Now, however, ad- vancing technology is creating a situation where in the first place we are developing a single world system that does not have the redundancy of the many isolated systems of the past and in which therefore if any- thing goes wrong everything goes wrong. The Mayan civilization could collapse in 900 A.D., and collapse almost irretrievably without Europe or China even being aware of the fact. When we had a number of iso- lated systems, the catastrophe in one was ultimately recoverable by migration from the surviving systems. The one-world system, therefore, which science, transportation, and communication are rapidly giving us, is inherently more precarious than the many-world system of the past. It is all the more important, therefore, to make it internally robust and capable only of recoverable catastrophes. The necessity for stable peace, therefore, increases with every improvement in technology, either of war or of peacex

### Framing

#### 1. The role of the ballot is to answer the resolutional question “whether topical action is better than the status quo or competitive option”

#### Even if they win they don’t need a plan, because they have read one they should be forced to defend it --- anything else makes the aff a moving target and eviscerates negative clash

#### Extra-topicality --- arguing the benefits derived from their advocacy outweigh is a voting issue because we’re forced to win framework to get back to square one --- explodes aff ground and proves the resolution insufficient

#### “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

**Army Officer School 2005**

(“# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, 5-12, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### Resolved means enact policy

**Words and Phrases 1964** Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson, 03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### 2. They claim to win the debate for reasons other than the desirability of topical action

#### 3. Vote Negative:

#### A. Deliberative decision making

#### Linking the ballot to a should question in combination with USFG simulation teaches the skills to organize pragmatic consequences and philosophical values into a course of action

**Hanghoj, Aarhus education assistant professor, 2008**

(Thorkild, “Playful Knowledge An Explorative Study of Educational Gaming”, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf)

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of educational gaming cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. Dramatic rehearsal The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by projecting and choosing between various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding everyday rationality (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “thought experiment” will be successful. But what it can do is make the process of choosing more intelligent than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to inquire into and resolve scenario-specific problems (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a striking difference between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the actual consequences that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or simulate the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “competing possible lines of action” that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving the “right” answers, but more a question of exploring the contingent outcomes and domain-specific processes of problem-based scenarios.

#### Deliberation is the best model-continual testing bolsters advocacy and inclusion-this means we create better methods of engagement to resolve the AFF but they don’t resolve this offense-only switching sides on a point of stasis maximizes this potential

**Talisse, Vanderbilt philosophy professor, 2005**

(Robert, “Deliberativist responses to activist challenges”, Philosophy & Social Criticism, 31.4, project muse)

Nonetheless, the deliberativist conception of reasonableness differs from the activist’s in at least one crucial respect. On the deliberativist view, a necessary condition for reasonableness is the willingness not only to offer justifications for one’s own views and actions, but also to listen to criticisms, objections, and the justificatory reasons that can be given in favor of alternative proposals. In light of this further stipulation, we may say that, on the deliberative democrat’s view, reasonable citizens are responsive to reasons, their views are ‘reason tracking’. Reasonableness, then, entails an acknowledgement on the part of the citizen that her current views are possibly mistaken, incomplete, and in need of revision. Reasonableness is hence a two-way street: the reasonable citizen is able and willing to offer justifications for her views and actions, but is also prepared to consider alternate views, respond to criticism, answer objections, and, if necessary, revise or abandon her views. In short, reasonable citizens do not only believe and act for reasons, they aspire to believe and act according to the best reasons; consequently, they recognize their own fallibility in weighing reasons and hence engage in public deliberation in part for the sake of improving their views.15 ‘Reasonableness’ as the deliberative democrat understands it is constituted by a willingness to participate in an ongoing public discussion that inevitably involves processes of self-examination by which one at various moments rethinks and revises one’s views in light of encounters with new arguments and new considerations offered by one’s fellow deliberators. Hence Gutmann and Thompson write: Citizens who owe one another justifications for the laws that they seek to impose must take seriously the reasons their opponents give. Taking seriously the reasons one’s opponents give means that, at least for a certain range of views that one opposes, one must acknowledge the possibility that an opposing view may be shown to be correct in the future. This acknowledgement has implications not only for the way they regard their own views. It imposes an obligation to continue to test their own views, seeking forums in which the views can be challenged, and keeping open the possibility of their revision or even rejection.16 (2000: 172) That Young’s activist is not reasonable in this sense is clear from the ways in which he characterizes his activism. He claims that ‘Activities of protest, boycott, and disruption are more appropriate means for getting citizens to think seriously about what until then they have found normal and acceptable’ (106); activist tactics are employed for the sake of ‘bringing attention’ to injustice and making ‘a wider public aware of institutional wrongs’ (107). These characterizations suggest the presumption that questions of justice are essentially settled; the activist takes himself to know what justice is and what its implementation requires. He also believes he knows that those who oppose him are either the power-hungry beneficiaries of the unjust status quo or the inattentive and unaware masses who do not ‘think seriously’ about the injustice of the institutions that govern their lives and so unwittingly accept them. Hence his political activity is aimed exclusively at enlisting other citizens in support of the cause to which he is tenaciously committed. The activist implicitly holds that there could be no reasoned objection to his views concerning justice, and no good reason to endorse those institutions he deems unjust. The activist presumes to know that no deliberative encounter could lead him to reconsider his position or adopt a different method of social action; he ‘declines’ to ‘engage persons he disagrees with’ (107) in discourse because he has judged on a priori grounds that all opponents are either pathetically benighted or balefully corrupt. When one holds one’s view as the only responsible or just option, there is no need for reasoning with those who disagree, and hence no need to be reasonable. According to the deliberativist, this is the respect in which the activist is unreasonable. The deliberativist recognizes that questions of justice are difficult and complex. This is the case not only because justice is a notoriously tricky philosophical concept, but also because, even supposing we had a philosophically sound theory of justice, questions of implementation are especially thorny. Accordingly, political philosophers, social scientists, economists, and legal theorists continue to work on these questions. In light of much of this literature, it is difficult to maintain the level of epistemic confidence in one’s own views that the activist seems to muster; thus the deliberativist sees the activist’s confidence as evidence of a lack of honest engagement with the issues. A possible outcome of the kind of encounter the activist ‘declines’ (107) is the realization that the activist’s image of himself as a ‘David to the Goliath of power wielded by the state and corporate actors’ (106) is naïve. That is, the deliberativist comes to see, through processes of public deliberation, that there are often good arguments to be found on all sides of an important social issue; reasonableness hence demands that one must especially engage the reasons of those with whom one most vehemently disagrees and be ready to revise one’s own views if necessary. Insofar as the activist holds a view of justice that he is unwilling to put to the test of public criticism, he is unreasonable. Furthermore, insofar as the activist’s conception commits him to the view that there could be no rational opposition to his views, he is literally unable to be reasonable. Hence the deliberative democrat concludes that activism, as presented by Young’s activist, is an unreasonable model of political engagement. The dialogical conception of reasonableness adopted by the deliberativist also provides a response to the activist’s reply to the charge that he is engaged in interest group or adversarial politics. Recall that the activist denied this charge on the grounds that activism is aimed not at private or individual interests, but at the universal good of justice. But this reply also misses the force of the posed objection. On the deliberativist view, the problem with interest-based politics does not derive simply from the source (self or group), scope (particular or universal), or quality (admirable or deplorable) of the interest, but with the concept of interests as such. Not unlike ‘preferences’, ‘interests’ typically function in democratic theory as fixed dispositions that are non-cognitive and hence unresponsive to reasons. Insofar as the activist sees his view of justice as ‘given’ and not open to rational scrutiny, he is engaged in the kind of adversarial politics the deliberativist rejects. The argument thus far might appear to turn exclusively upon different conceptions of what reasonableness entails. The deliberativist view I have sketched holds that reasonableness involves some degree of what we may call epistemic modesty. On this view, the reasonable citizen seeks to have her beliefs reflect the best available reasons, and so she enters into public discourse as a way of testing her views against the objections and questions of those who disagree; hence she implicitly holds that her present view is open to reasonable critique and that others who hold opposing views may be able to offer justifications for their views that are at least as strong as her reasons for her own. Thus any mode of politics that presumes that discourse is extraneous to questions of justice and justification is unreasonable. The activist sees no reason to accept this. Reasonableness for the activist consists in the ability to act on reasons that upon due reflection seem adequate to underwrite action; discussion with those who disagree need not be involved. According to the activist, there are certain cases in which he does in fact know the truth about what justice requires and in which there is no room for reasoned objection. Under such conditions, the deliberativist’s demand for discussion can only obstruct justice; it is therefore irrational. It may seem that we have reached an impasse. However, there is a further line of criticism that the activist must face. To the activist’s view that at least in certain situations he may reasonably decline to engage with persons he disagrees with (107), the deliberative democrat can raise the phenomenon that Cass Sunstein has called ‘group polarization’ (Sunstein, 2003; 2001a: ch. 3; 2001b: ch. 1). To explain: consider that political activists cannot eschew deliberation altogether; they often engage in rallies, demonstrations, teach-ins, workshops, and other activities in which they are called to make public the case for their views. Activists also must engage in deliberation among themselves when deciding strategy. Political movements must be organized, hence those involved must decide upon targets, methods, and tactics; they must also decide upon the content of their pamphlets and the precise messages they most wish to convey to the press. Often the audience in both of these deliberative contexts will be a self-selected and sympathetic group of like-minded activists. Group polarization is a well-documented phenomenon that has ‘been found all over the world and in many diverse tasks’; it means that ‘members of a deliberating group predictably move towards a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members’ predeliberation tendencies’ (Sunstein, 2003: 81–2). Importantly, in groups that ‘engage in repeated discussions’ over time, the polarization is even more pronounced (2003: 86). Hence discussion in a small but devoted activist enclave that meets regularly to strategize and protest ‘should produce a situation in which individuals hold positions more extreme than those of any individual member before the series of deliberations began’ (ibid.).17 The fact of group polarization is relevant to our discussion because the activist has proposed that he may reasonably decline to engage in discussion with those with whom he disagrees in cases in which the requirements of justice are so clear that he can be confident that he has the truth. Group polarization suggests that deliberatively confronting those with whom we disagree is essential even when we have the truth. For even if we have the truth, if we do not engage opposing views, but instead deliberate only with those with whom we agree, our view will shift progressively to a more extreme point, and thus we lose the truth. In order to avoid polarization, deliberation must take place within heterogeneous ‘argument pools’ (Sunstein, 2003: 93). This of course does not mean that there should be no groups devoted to the achievement of some common political goal; it rather suggests that engagement with those with whom one disagrees is essential to the proper pursuit of justice. Insofar as the activist denies this, he is unreasonable.

#### Effective deliberative discourse is the lynchpin to solving all existential social and political problems

**Lundberg, UNC Chapel Hill communications professor, 2010**

(Christian, Tradition of Debate in North Carolina” in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century, pg 311-3)

The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary pedagogical •outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by •debate are not limited to speech—as indicated earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and better public judgment. If the picture of modern political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and technological change out pacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to re-articulation, it is open to re-articulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Dewey in The Public and Its Problems place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63,154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to sort through and evaluate the evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to them. The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, 140) argues that one of the primary failings of modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multi-mediated information environment (ibid.), Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self efficacy ratings of their ability to navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources: To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instruction/no instruction and debate topic ... that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned... students in the Instructional [debate] group were significantly more confident in their ability to access information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so.... These findings clearly indicate greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in [debate] These results constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144) Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthen and Gaylen Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in 1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthen and Pack's framing of the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials. There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for expanding debate practice in the as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative capacities. The unique combination of critical-thinking skills, research and information-skills, oral-communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education and serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded, and self-critical students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of democratic life. Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens who can actively and effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive and to deal with systemic threats that risk our collective extinction. Democratic societies face a myriad of challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international stability in the form of terrorism, intervention, and new possibilities for great power conflict; and increasing challenges of rapid globalization, including an increasingly volatile global economic structure. More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance, and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in an increasingly complex world. Given the challenge of perfecting our collective political skill, and in drawing on the best of our collective creative intelligence, it is incumbent on us to both make the case for and, more important, to do the concrete work to realize an expanded commitment to debate at colleges and universities.

**Policy is a tool to resolve our impacts, not paralyze action**

**Shove & Walker, 7** - \*Sociology @ Lancaster, \*\*Geography @ Lancaster

Elizabeth “CAUTION! Transitions ahead: politics, practice, and sustainable transition management” Environment and Planning C 39 (4)

For academic readers, our commentary argues for loosening the intellectual grip of ‘innovation studies’, for backing off from the nested, hierarchical multi-level model as the only model in town, and for exploring other social scientific, but also systemic theories of change. The more we think about the politics and practicalities of reflexive transition management, the more complex the process appears: for a policy audience, our words of caution could be read as an invitation to abandon the whole endeavour. If agency, predictability and legitimacy are as limited as we’ve suggested, this might be the only sensible conclusion.However, we are with Rip (2006) in recognising the value, productivity and everyday necessity of an ‘illusion **of agency’**, and of the working expectation that a difference can be made even in the face of so much evidence to the contrary. The outcomes of actions are unknowable, the system unsteerable and the effects of deliberate intervention inherently unpredictable and, ironically, it is this that sustains concepts of agency and management. As Rip argues ‘**illusions are productive** because they **motivate action** and repair work, and thus something (whatever) is achieved’ (Rip 2006: 94). Situated inside the systems they seek to influence, governance actors – and actors of other kinds as well - are part of the **dynamics of change**: even if they cannot steer from the outside they are **necessary to processes within**. This is, of course, also true of academic life. Here we are, busy critiquing and analysing transition management in the expectation that somebody somewhere is listening and maybe even taking notice. If we removed that illusion would we bother writing anything at all? Maybe we need such fictions to keep us going, and maybe – fiction or no - somewhere along the line something really does happen, but not in ways that we can anticipate or know.

#### Method focus causes scholarly paralysis

**Jackson, American University School of International Service IR associate professor, 11**

(Patrick Thadeus, “The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations”, p. 57-59)

Perhaps the greatest irony of this instrumental, decontextualized importation of “falsification” and its critics into IR is the way that an entire line of thought that privileged disconfirmation and refutation—no matter how complicated that disconfirmation and refutation was in practice—has been transformed into a license to **worry endlessly about foundational assumptions.** At the very beginning of the effort to bring terms such as “paradigm” to bear on the study of politics, Albert O. **Hirschman** (1970b, 338) **noted this very danger**, suggesting that without “a little more ‘reverence for life’ and a little less straightjacketing of the future,” the **focus on** producing internally **consistent** packages of **assumptions instead of** actually examining **complex empirical situations would result in scholarly paralysis.** Here as elsewhere, Hirschman appears to have been quite prescient, inasmuch as the major effect of paradigm and research programme language in IR seems to have been a series of debates and discussions about whether the fundamentals of a given school of thought were sufficiently “scientific” in their construction. Thus **we have debates about how to evaluate scientific progress**, and attempts to propose one or another set of research design principles **as uniquely scientific**, and inventive, “reconstructions” of IR schools, such as Patrick James’ “elaborated structural realism,” supposedly for the purpose of placing them on a **firmer scientific** footing by making sure that they have all of the required elements of a basically Lakatosian19 model of science (James 2002, 67, 98–103). The bet with all of this scholarly activity seems to be that if we can just get the fundamentals right, then scientific progress will inevitably ensue . . . even though this is the precise opposite of what Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos argued! In fact, all of this obsessive interest in foundations and starting-points is, in form if not in content, a lot closer to logical positivism than it is to the concerns of the falsificationist philosophers, despite the prominence of language about “hypothesis testing” and the concern to formulate testable hypotheses among IR scholars engaged in these endeavors. That, above all, is why I have labeled this methodology of scholarship neopositivist. While it takes much of its self justification as a science from criticisms of logical positivism, in overall sensibility it still operates in a visibly positivist way, attempting to construct knowledge from the ground up by getting its foundations in logical order before concentrating on how claims encounter the world in terms of their theoretical implications. This is by no means to say that neopositivism is not interested in hypothesis testing; on the contrary, neopositivists are extremely concerned with testing hypotheses, but **only after the fundamentals have been** soundly **established.** Certainty, not conjectural provisionality, seems to be the goal—a goal that, ironically, Popper and Kuhn and Lakatos would all reject.

#### Every study of credible social theories concludes consequentialism is good---Scientific studies of biology, evolution, and psychology prove that deontological proclivities are only illogical layovers from evolution

**Greene, Harvard University Department of Psychology Associate Professor of Social science, 10**

(Joshua, “The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul published in Moral Psychology: Historical and Contemporary Readings”, [www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf](http://www.fed.cuhk.edu.hk/~lchang/material/Evolutionary/Developmental/Greene-KantSoul.pdf))

What turn-of-the-millennium science is telling us is that human moral judgment is not a pristine rational enterprise, that our moral judgments are driven by a hodgepodge of emotional dispositions, which themselves were shaped by a hodgepodge of evolutionary forces, both biological and cultural. Because of this, it is exceedingly unlikely that there is any rationally coherent normative moral theory that can accommodate our moral intuitions. Moreover, anyone who claims to have such a theory, or even part of one, almost certainly doesn't. Instead, what that person probably has is a moral rationalization. It seems then, that we have somehow crossed the infamous "is"-"ought" divide. How did this happen? Didn't Hume (Hume, 1978) and Moore (Moore, 1966) warn us against trying to derive an "ought" from and "is?" How did we go from descriptive scientific theories concerning moral psychology to skepticism about a whole class of normative moral theories? The answer is that we did not, as Hume and Moore anticipated, attempt to derive an "ought" from and "is." That is, our method has been inductive rather than deductive. We have inferred on the basis of the available evidence that the phenomenon of rationalist deontological philosophy is best explained as a rationalization of evolved emotional intuition (Harman, 1977). Missing the Deontological Point I suspect that rationalist deontologists will remain unmoved by the arguments presented here. Instead, I suspect, they will insist that I have simply misunderstood what Kant and like-minded deontologists are all about. Deontology, they will say, isn't about this intuition or that intuition. It's not defined by its normative differences with consequentialism. Rather, deontology is about taking humanity seriously. Above all else, it's about respect for persons. It's about treating others as fellow rational creatures rather than as mere objects, about acting for reasons rational beings can share. And so on (Korsgaard, 1996a; Korsgaard, 1996b). This is, no doubt, how many deontologists see deontology. But this insider's view, as I've suggested, may be misleading. The problem, more specifically, is that it defines deontology in terms of values that are not distinctively deontological, though they may appear to be from the inside. Consider the following analogy with religion. When one asks a religious person to explain the essence of his religion, one often gets an answer like this: "It's about love, really. It's about looking out for other people, looking beyond oneself. It's about community, being part of something larger than oneself." This sort of answer accurately captures the phenomenology of many people's religion, but it's nevertheless inadequate for distinguishing religion from other things. This is because many, if not most, non-religious people aspire to love deeply, look out for other people, avoid self-absorption, have a sense of a community, and be connected to things larger than themselves. In other words, secular humanists and atheists can assent to most of what many religious people think religion is all about. From a secular humanist's point of view, in contrast, what's distinctive about religion is its commitment to the existence of supernatural entities as well as formal religious institutions and doctrines. And they're right. These things really do distinguish religious from non-religious practices, though they may appear to be secondary to many people operating from within a religious point of view. In the same way, I believe that most of the standard deontological/Kantian self-characterizatons fail to distinguish deontology from other approaches to ethics. (See also Kagan (Kagan, 1997, pp. 70-78.) on the difficulty of defining deontology.) It seems to me that consequentialists, as much as anyone else, have respect for persons, are against treating people as mere objects, wish to act for reasons that rational creatures can share, etc. A consequentialist respects other persons, and refrains from treating them as mere objects, by counting every person's well-being in the decision-making process. Likewise, a consequentialist attempts to act according to reasons that rational creatures can share by acting according to principles that give equal weight to everyone's interests, i.e. that are impartial. This is not to say that consequentialists and deontologists don't differ. They do. It's just that the real differences may not be what deontologists often take them to be. What, then, distinguishes deontology from other kinds of moral thought? A good strategy for answering this question is to start with concrete disagreements between deontologists and others (such as consequentialists) and then work backward in search of deeper principles. This is what I've attempted to do with the trolley and footbridge cases, and other instances in which deontologists and consequentialists disagree. If you ask a deontologically-minded person why it's wrong to push someone in front of speeding trolley in order to save five others, you will get characteristically deontological answers. Some will be tautological: "Because it's murder!" Others will be more sophisticated: "The ends don't justify the means." "You have to respect people's rights." But, as we know, these answers don't really explain anything, because if you give the same people (on different occasions) the trolley case or the loop case (See above), they'll make the opposite judgment, even though their initial explanation concerning the footbridge case applies equally well to one or both of these cases. Talk about rights, respect for persons, and reasons we can share are natural attempts to explain, in "cognitive" terms, what we feel when we find ourselves having emotionally driven intuitions that are odds with the cold calculus of consequentialism. Although these explanations are inevitably incomplete, there seems to be "something deeply right" about them because they give voice to powerful moral emotions. But, as with many religious people's accounts of what's essential to religion, they don't really explain what's distinctive about the philosophy in question.

#### Reps don’t come first and don’t cause violence

**Rodwell, Manchester Metropolitan University PhD candidate, 2005**

(Jonathan, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson”, <http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm>)

In this response I wish to argue that the Post-Structural analysis put forward by Richard Jackson is inadequate when trying to understand American Politics and Foreign Policy. The key point is that this is an issue of methodology and theory. I do not wish to argue that language is not important, in the current political scene (or indeed any political era) that would be unrealistic. One cannot help but be convinced that the creation of identity, of defining ones self (or one nation, or societies self) in opposition to an ‘other’ does indeed take place. Masses of written and aural evidence collated by Jackson clearly demonstrates that there is a discursive pattern surrounding post 9/11 U.S. politics and society. [i] Moreover as expressed at the start of this paper it is a political pattern and logic that this language is useful for politicians, especially when able to marginalise other perspectives. Nothing illustrates this clearer than the fact George W. Bush won re-election, for whatever the reasons he did win, it is undeniable that at the very least the war in Iraq, though arguable far from a success, at the absolute minimum did not damage his campaign. Additionally it is surely not stretching credibility to argue Bush performance and rhetoric during the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also strengthened his position. However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical. My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding . The first major problem then is that historiographically discourse analysis is so capacious as to be largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history that explains everything and therefore actually explains nothing. To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated”[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model.